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A Contemporary Geopolitical Framework of Analysis

Introduction

For several years now, the issue of Somaliland has regularly resurfaced in geopolitical analyses concerning the Horn of Africa. This entity, de facto independent since 1991 but not internationally recognised, has attracted the interest of several regional and international actors, including Israel.

In this context, some observers refer to the name of Oded Yinon, author of a strategic text published in 1982, in order to propose an ideological reading of certain current dynamics.

The aim here is not to assert one claim or another, but rather to examine continuities in strategic reasoning. This is a geopolitical analysis.

1. Oded Yinon’s text: what does it really say?

In 1982, Oded Yinon published an article in the journal Kivunim in which he developed a central thesis:
Israel’s stability and security would be ensured through the weakening of major regional states perceived as structurally unstable.

According to this analysis:

  • many states in the Middle East and neighbouring regions are artificial constructs inherited from colonial borders;
  • their ethnic, religious or clan-based fractures constitute internal factors of disintegration;
  • smaller, more homogeneous entities would be less likely to pose a strategic threat.

2. The Horn of Africa: a major strategic space

The Horn of Africa is a region of global strategic importance:

  • immediate proximity to the Red Sea;
  • indirect control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key passage for international maritime trade;
  • an interface between Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Somaliland remains unrecognised by the international community, mainly in order to preserve the principle of Somalia’s territorial integrity.

3. Israeli interest in Somaliland: elements of analysis

Several factors help explain the strategic interest frequently mentioned by analysts:

a) Maritime and regional security

A presence or indirect cooperation in this region would allow:

  • increased monitoring of maritime routes;
  • better anticipation of regional threats;
  • limitation of the influence of hostile actors in the Red Sea area.

b) Pragmatic African diplomacy

For several decades, Israel has pursued what is often described as a “peripheral” diplomacy:

  • discreet bilateral partnerships;
  • security and technological cooperation;
  • relations with states or entities on the margins of traditional geopolitical balances.

c) The logic of weak but stable states

From a realist perspective in international relations, some states prefer:

  • fragmented but predictable neighbours;
  • rather than large, unstable entities likely to turn hostile.

This logic, far from being exclusive to Israel, reflects a reality shared by many powers: divide in order to rule.

4. Ideological continuity, not mechanical application

Linking Oded Yinon to the Somaliland issue does not mean that a “Yinon Plan” is being directly applied today. Rather, it points to an observable intellectual continuity in certain strategic orientations — a modernised and updated version of Oded Yinon’s reasoning, whose objective nevertheless remains the same:

  • interest in regional peripheries;
  • preference for fragmented balances;
  • adaptation to existing local realities rather than the artificial creation of new fractures.

Weakening, impoverishment and division of the Muslim world — considered by radicalised Zionist elites as a “civilisation of darkness”.

Somalia’s fragmentation is the result of:

  • colonial history;
  • state collapse;
  • the American invasion;
  • prolonged internal conflicts.

External actors, including Israel, unfortunately operate within this existing reality.

A proxy-driven strategic rivalry

Turkey’s growing presence in Somalia — whether military, economic or institutional — has profoundly altered regional balances in the Horn of Africa. In this context, certain states view Somali fragmentation and the emergence of peripheral entities as an indirect way to contain Turkish influence without direct confrontation.

This is not an open conflict, but a classic logic of proxy rivalry: rather than confronting an increasingly influential actor head-on, efforts are made to reduce its strategic depth, limit its footholds, and counterbalance its presence through alternative partnerships.

Somalia thus becomes, against its will, a space of geopolitical reconfiguration, where local ambitions intersect with the competing strategies of external powers, each seeking to defend its interests without openly assuming a direct conflict.

The interest of the Ummah lies in its unity; the interest of Somalia lies in its territorial integrity. Both require the rejection of external interference — particularly those inspired by Oded Yinon — which thrive on division, the weakening of peoples, and the fragmentation of Muslim lands, to the detriment of their sovereignty and dignity.

Conclusion

The frequently mentioned link between Oded Yinon, regional fragmentation and the Somaliland issue is above all a highly plausible geopolitical reading.

Understanding these dynamics nevertheless allows us to:

  • better analyse unconventional diplomatic choices;
  • avoid ideological oversimplifications;
  • grasp how powers adapt to a world in which states are often reshaped from within.

Contemporary geopolitics is one of strategic continuities, opportunities and pragmatic adaptations.